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Introduction1 
 
We had a memorable yesterday…We enjoy a splendid today. The flower of Sino-African friendship 
is blooming with the care and nurturing of the Chinese and African peoples. We will greet a 
flourishing tomorrow…China, the biggest developing country in the world, is ready to join hands 
with Africa, the biggest developing continent in the world, to…march into the 21st century full of 
confidence.2 
 
China’s expanding relations with Africa are the most important dynamic in the foreign relations and 
politics of the continent since the end of the Cold War. The nature and implications of China’s 
renewed engagement with Africa are only beginning to be appreciated, but it is already clear that 
this is a process of profound significance. The unprecedented interest among the media, academic 
quarters, and a range of governments and international organizations that has gathered momentum 
since 2006 recalls, and has already exceeded, the last comparable episode of attention following 
Premier Zhou Enlai’s African ‘political safari’ in 1963-64. Rather than revolutionary prospects 
being ‘excellent’, as Zhou (in)famously declared in Mogadishu, some regard China’s ‘new strategic 
partnership’ with Africa as bearing such potential in terms of common prosperity through ‘win-win’ 
cooperation, while others see mixed benefits and the potential for threat.  
 
This paper presents a scoping analysis of the main contours of relations, offering an anatomy of key 
dimensions of an expansive Chinese engagement in the continent that remains dynamic. It begins 
by contextualising current relations by locating these within a longer history of ties and tracing the 
emergence of the current engagement after 1989 and the catalyst of China’s go global strategy after 
2000. It proceeds to identify the key economic and political drivers of China’s African engagement, 
before surveying key economic trends and noting China’s aid programme. It concludes by assessing 
the implications for international politics and the pressure China’s own foreign relations principles 
impose upon its increasingly multifaceted role.  
 
Background 
 
China’s ‘Year of Africa’ in 2006 saw China-Africa relations attain an unusual prominence. In 
January the now-traditional New Year’s tour of Africa by the Chinese Foreign Minister Li 
Zhaoxing, who visited Cape Verde, Liberia, Mali, Senegal, Nigeria and Libya, was followed by the 
release of China’s first Africa policy statement and tours by President Hu Jintao (Morocco, Nigeria 
and Kenya) in April and Premier Wen Jiabao (Egypt, Ghana, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Angola, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda) in June. The wide geographical extent of these tours 
was reinforced by regional meetings of the Macau Forum and the Conference of Sino-Arab 
Friendship. However it was the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation on 4-5 November 2006 
(FOCAC) that most strikingly showcased China’s new ‘strategic partnership’ with Africa. Beijing 
was decorated with a selection of images of Africa and a profusion of public banners proclaimed 
‘Friendship, Peace, Cooperation and Development’ (youyi, heping, hezuo, fazhan). As the third 
ministerial and first heads of state summit, FOCAC was attended by ‘leaders of China and 48 
                                                 
1 This is an updated and expanded version of the introductory and concluding chapters in Alden, Large and Soares de 
Oliveira (ed.) (2008). China Returns to Africa: A rising power and a continent embrace London: Hurst.  
2 President Jiang Zemin, speech to the Organization of African Unity, Addis Ababa, 13 May 2006. ChinaAfrica, 66 
(June 1996), p. 24. 
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African nations’.3 It amounted to a public declaration of China’s arrival in Africa, and sought to 
impress this upon the African guests and the world at large. 
 
The recent visibility of China-Africa relations has been accompanied by grand pronouncements 
about the new ‘age of the dragon’ in Africa. External coverage from various quarters, especially 
pronounced in certain Western media, at times has suggested that China has suddenly exploded into 
and is now even in the process of ‘conquering Africa’.4 There have been sweeping calls for Africa 
to ‘Look East’ in a new, more optimistic age of economic growth and apparent political 
opportunity. As one Kenyan newspaper asked: ‘With China calling, is it time to say goodbye to 
[the] US and Europe?’5 At the same time there have been growing concerns, sometimes articulated 
through a discourse of ‘neo-colonialism’, that China’s relations with Africa replicate and reinforce 
established patterns that are unfavourable to African development. Such questions are important 
and are set to be considered for some time. Rather than ‘the age of the dragon descending upon 
Africa’,6 or indeed a new ‘panda menace’ looming over the continent,7 however, Chinese 
engagement with Africa today represents the continuing development of relations that were revived 
in a more concerted manner under state direction from Beijing after 1989 and, in turn, have been 
cultivated by different African governing elites. While China’s inward focus on the daunting task of 
modernization preoccupied its leadership after 1978, Africa found itself downgraded in China’s 
official foreign relations, although it was by no means forgotten. China repositioned itself and 
reached out to Africa again in a new phase during the 1980s (which began, for example, with 
Beijing’s support for Salim Salim’s bid to become UN Secretary General in 1981). Following the 
repression of the pro-democracy movement in Tiananmen Square in June 1989, Beijing looked to 
Africa for political support and increasingly as a source of resources and a potential market. The 
post-colonial Chinese engagement with Africa may have been episodic, as a result of a combination 
of domestic politics and China’s own foreign relations, but there was an underlying continuity of 
ties.8 
 
The historical background to China’s longstanding connections with different parts of Africa can 
only be very generally summarized here (see Snow, 1988; Filesi, 1972; Duyvendak, 1949; Gao, 
1984). The example of the Ming Dynasty diplomatic missions seeking trade and recognition on 
behalf of the Chinese Emperor, as opposed to conquest or occupation—famously Zheng He’s seven 
voyages between 1405 and 1433—continues to be regularly invoked to demonstrate a contrast to 
European exploration and conquest in Africa. Together with shared colonial experience, it remains 
an important part of the basis for claims that China is different in the manner in which it relates to 
Africa. As Philip Snow has documented in The Star Raft: China’s Encounter with Africa, the 
historical backdrop is important. It imbues China’s approach to its Africa relations, and the use of 
history is a notable aspect of China’s connections with the continent. The third FOCAC, during the 
50th anniversary year of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the People’s Republic of 
China’s (PRC) and Egypt, was underpinned by historical recollection emphasizing the 
commonalities between China and Africa: cradles of civilization, victims of colonialism, a 
developing country and developing continent (see, for example, Yuan, 2006). 
 
The PRC’s engagement with Africa waxed and waned according to its domestic situation, Cold 
War politics and its dispute with the Soviet Union (Hevi, 1966; Larkin, 1971; Ogunsanwo, 1974; 
Yu, 1970; Yu, 1975; Jackson, 1995). Beijing rhetorically championed Third World causes during 
the different phases of its involvement with Africa, including the revolutionary ‘national liberation’ 
                                                 
3 See www.focac.org. 
4 Andreas Lorenz and Thilo Thielke, ‘China’s Conquest of Africa’, Der Spiegel, 30 May 2007. 
5 Mark Sorbara, The Nation (Nairobi), 13 April 2006. 
6 Lorenz and Thielke, ‘China’s Conquest of Africa’. 
7 Antoine Halff, ‘The Panda Menace’, The National Interest, July 2007. 
8 As one title, capturing part of the high interest generated by the latest phase of relations, asserted: ‘China in Africa: 
They’re Back!’ George Moose, Africa Policy Journal, 2 (2006). 
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struggles of the 1960s and ‘self reliant development’ of the 1970s. China sought to use its relations 
with Africa to enhance its position vis-à-vis the US and Taiwan, as it previously had done vis-à-vis 
the Soviet Union (Van Ness, 1998: 151). The PRC’s involvement in Africa took different forms—
including support for liberation struggles and aid programmes—but its foremost motivation was not 
based on resource needs. As Larkin observed in 1971: ‘For the most part strategic minerals do not 
figure prominently in China’s quest for economic relations with Africa.’ (Larkin, 1971: 93) Rather, 
it was driven,  by the combination of a desire to pursue prestigious aid work and geopolitical 
exigencies, including strategic competition with Taiwan before and after Beijing’s successful entry 
into the UN with the support of African votes in October 1971 (See Yu, 1963; Yu and 
Longenecker, 1994). More limited Chinese engagement in Africa during the 1980s reflected 
China’s changed internal development and modernization priorities under Deng Xiaoping, as did 
the reorientation of Chinese aid in Africa during the 1980s when its political philanthropy 
developed into more commercially oriented involvement. China’s aid programme in Africa may 
have been scaled back in the 1980s, but commerce continued. Chinese business ventures or 
infrastructure projects may not have proceeded on a comparable scale to today but were active in a 
number of contexts. Zhao Ziyang’s tour of eleven African countries in late 1982 and early 1983, 
designed to repeat Zhou Enlai’s ground-breaking tour, sought to reinvigorate relations and assert 
shared Third World identity (See Bräutigam, 1998; Yu, 1988).  
 
Facing international isolation after the Tiananmen Square crackdown, China reinvigorated its 
political interest in Africa and embarked once again on proactive Africa diplomacy. This was 
catalyzed by President Jiang Zemin’s tour of Egypt, Kenya, Ethiopia, Mali, Namibia and Zimbabwe 
and his address to the Organization of African Unity in May 1996. In calling for the rejuvenation of 
‘traditional projects aided by China’, increased political cooperation and expanded economic ties, 
Jiang offered an optimistic vision of flourishing relations. Even then, however, with a trade volume 
of $3.5-4 billion, China’s share of Africa’s trade was comparatively small. The Chinese government 
was keen to address its trade surplus with Africa: ‘China only exports but imports little’ from 
African countries.9 At this stage, recognition that ‘Africa is a market with great potential’ was 
accompanied by increased government and enterprise interest in economic engagement, the entry of 
Exim Bank and establishment of Investment, Exploitation and Trade Centres in Egypt, Gabon, 
Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea and Mali which were intended to combine investment, resource 
extraction and trade functions. The impressive thickening of ties that has been evident since 2000 
has thus followed on from the 1990s, but through a more concerted drive to expand China’s 
engagement in Africa (see Taylor, 2006a). 
 
China’s African engagement: policy and drivers 
 
Current relations are developing in a markedly different context from previous periods of Chinese 
involvement in Africa. China’s engagement today is occurring under new circumstances in which a 
more developed China operates under conditions of growing interdependence and plays an 
increasingly important role in the global economy. The ideological disagreements of the Cold War 
have been superseded by economic competition and political differences, as China participates in 
the global economy and pursues better trade terms rather than an alternative socialist vision. 
Beijing’s engagement appears to be predicated upon a longer-term timeframe and driven by 
economic diplomacy rather than the ambitious ideology of the past. The key factors propelling 
Chinese engagement in Africa can be summarized as a combination of domestic Chinese dynamics, 
desire to expand into new markets and international political factors (See Alden, 2007; Tull, 2006). 
 
The Forum for China-Africa Co-operation is the main state-level mechanism of formal cooperation 
in China-Africa relations. FOCAC is a distinctively bilateral arrangement in China’s relations with 
                                                 
9 ‘Economic and trade relations between China and African countries in 1996’, Almanac of China’s Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade 1997/1998, p. 430. 
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the current 49 African countries recognising Beijing. Its three meetings to date (Beijing in October 
2000; Addis Ababa in December 2003, and Beijing in 2006) combined bilateral meetings at which 
aid and business deals are discussed, with parallel business meetings facilitating exchanges and 
deals between African and Chinese businesses, and reaffirmation of the importance and healthy 
state of relations. The FOCAC is the main but not the only forum.10 It matters as a meeting venue to 
mark progress, publicly sign deals or outline future relations but it does not have a developed 
institutional apparatus with any autonomous role in China’s African policy. Nor does it appear to 
have a significant role in directing relations beyond a formal public coordination and presentation 
one.11 Its relevance should be situated within those sections of the Chinese government directing 
African policy, most importantly the CCP Central Committee’s Leading Group on Foreign Affairs 
(headed by Hu Jintao) which formulates external policy. The Department of African Affairs (DAA) 
within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs implements top Chinese leaders policies, including through 
the FOCAC (which has a Chinese ‘Follow-up Committee’ made up of more than twenty state 
agencies, headed by the Secretary General of the DAA). With the other important ministry, the 
Ministry of Commerce, the departments of West Asian and African Affairs, and Aid to Foreign 
Countries, are particularly important in formulating China’s Africa policy. Feeding into these is a 
network of research organizations and academics, often directly advising leaders.12  
 
The overarching driver has been the Chinese government’s strategic pursuit of resources and 
attempts to ensure raw material supplies for growing energy needs within China, in part reflecting 
the country’s position as a centre of global manufacturing. Most significant Chinese activity and 
investment in Africa is related to this demand, rooted in domestic economic and political changes in 
China and the changing profile of resource needs accompanying its economic development and role 
in the global economy. ‘An unprecedented need for resources is now driving China’s foreign 
policy.’ (Zweig and Jianhui, 2005: 25; Taylor, 2006b) China’s post-1978 determined focus on 
economic development contributed to an annual growth rate of over 9%. From the 1990s, however, 
it became necessary to acquire overseas supplies, including energy.13 China’s energy diplomacy has 
become a notable foreign policy issue under President Hu Jintao, who has led expanded diplomacy 
not merely in Africa but around the world, including the Middle East and Latin America. The 
Chinese government’s diplomacy with oil states is aimed to a considerable extent at enhancing its 
energy security (Downs, 2004). 
 
A further factor is Africa’s status as an arena for Chinese companies to develop and a market with 
strong commercial potential for Chinese business. The Chinese government, businesses, and 
entrepreneurs have regarded (or, for many businesses, been financially encouraged to regard) Africa 
as a continent of economic potential populated by consumers. Explicitly rejecting ‘Afro-
pessimism’, to date they appear to have not been overly encumbered by investment constraints or 
concern about political instability that have affected other investors. Central government support for 
Chinese state owned enterprises (SOEs) has been important in directing FDI in Africa, as opposed 
to other regions, though proportionally speaking, Africa has received a comparatively minor share 
of China’s total overseas FDI; in 2006, Africa took 4% of China’s total FDI (as compared to 
Europe’s 3%, Latin America’s 26% and Asia’s 64%).14 The recent rise in FDI since 2006 and 
related expansion of business activity is a striking trend nonetheless. Africa is a market but also a 
testing ground for Chinese companies in China’s ‘going out’ policy to gain experience as well as 
                                                 
10 There is also the Macau-based Economic Forum for Co-operation between China and the Community of Portuguese-
speaking Countries, and the Sino-Arab Friendship conference established at the end of November 2006 in Khartoum. 
11 See http://www.focac.org/eng/ 
12 These include the Chinese Academy of Social Science’s Institute for West Asian and African Studies, and 
government think tanks such as China Institute of Contemporary Relations. A number of established Chinese official 
NGOs such as the Chinese Association for International Understanding or the China Society for Afro-Asian 
Development and Exchange are also involved. 
13 Martyn Davies has also argued that a longer-term (25-year) strategy of seeking to extract the Chinese economy from 
international commodity networks may operate too. Chatham House 14 December 2006 (on record). 
14 Chinese Ministry of Commerce, China’s Outward FDI Report 2006. 
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establish and expand business ventures in the continent and into the global arena. While most 
business and related political activity occurs at the state level, including SOEs, a further trend of 
increasing private entrepreneurial activity is evident in numerous locations, including, notably 
many countries not deemed to have strategic importance in the way that the small number of 
resource-rich countries such as Angola or Nigeria are.15 
 
Finally, there are political factors operating as part of what is styled ‘win-win cooperation’. Since 
helping China gain admission to the UN, African states have supported China (including in the 
years following 1989) in different multilateral settings. China in turn styles itself as leader of the 
global South and champion of a progressive ‘new international political and economic order 
featuring justice, rationality, equality and mutual benefit’ and ‘safeguarding legitimate rights and 
interests of developing countries.’ (China’s African Policy, January 2006, Part IV (5).) Efforts to 
work with and speak for Africa as part of the global South are intertwined in China’s emerging role 
in international affairs. It has highlighted its development efforts in Africa, with attendant claims to 
international status. Two additional political dynamics in China’s wider foreign policy are also at 
work in the African context. The first is China’s strategic competition with Japan as manifested in 
Africa. This is seen particularly in the underlying objective of opposing Japan’s UN Security 
Council aspirations, in which African state votes would play a role. Beijing’s ability to marshal 
African support against Tokyo’s aims was seen at the Asian African Summit in April 2005, where 
Chinese lobbying blocked an endorsement of a Japanese seat. However, the second area is more 
prominent, even if it is receding in importance for Beijing  compared to the past. The One China 
principle, the fundamental exception to China’s ‘no-strings attached’ policy,16 has seen the Chinese 
government use African support in its cross-Straits campaign.17 Inviting Taiwan-recognizing 
African states to attend FOCAC 3 as observers demonstrated a new approach to winning over the 
remaining recalcitrant states. The Chinese government’s aim to deny space to Taiwan in Africa is 
succeeding, though the subject remains a sensitive issue for Beijing and the possibility that African 
states can play the Taiwan card to exert leverage vis-à-vis Beijing remains. Taiwan’s political 
prospects in the continent are nonetheless bleak and rest on a dwindling number of small, 
strategically insignificant states. Four out of a worldwide total of 23 states that recognize Taiwan 
are in Africa: Burkina Faso, The Gambia, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Swaziland. Malawi cut ties 
with Taipei in January 2008 but the loss of Chad in August 2006 was a particular setback for 
Taiwan as, in contrast to Taiwan’s other African allies, it represented strong potential in terms of 
resources. Like the profile of mainland China’s trade with Africa when set against its wider trade 
patterns as a while, Taiwan’s economic relations with Africa, facilitated by the Africa Taiwan 
Economic Forum, constitute a proportionally small amount of its foreign trade.18  
 
Taiwan, nonetheless, continues to promote its role in Africa. The first Taiwan-Africa Heads of State 
Summit was held in Taipei on 9 September 2007. It saw Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian 
joined by King Mswati II of Swaziland, President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, President 
Fradique de Menezes of São Tomé and Príncipe, President Bingu wa Mutharika of Malawi, and 
                                                 
15 This is assisted by such bodies as the China-Africa Business Council, established in 2004 to support China's private 
sector investment in Cameroon, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania. 
16 Zambian opposition leader Michael Sata discovered this to dramatic effect after calling Taiwan a ‘sovereign state’ 
during the presidential elections of September 2006. This prompted China’s Ambassador to Zambia to denounce his 
interference in China's sovereignty in an episode that, rather than being taken simply as a transgression of China’s non-
interference framework, might be better regarded as anchored in China’s ‘internal’ politics. 
17 This was seen, for example, when China’s African allies rallied behind its Anti-Secession Law in March 2005. 
Formal support for the One China policy is routinely expressed in official exchanges. 
18 Overall trade with Taiwan’s African allies amounted to just over $56 million in 2006, with Swaziland the highest-
ranking state (trade running at US$30.2 million or 0.007% of total trade. According to data from the Taiwanese Bureau 
of Foreign Trade, it conducted the most business in 2006 with Angola, which ranked as Taiwan’s highest trade partner 
in the continent with a volume of US$2.15 billion (0.46% of total trade, or 27th position) behind South Africa with 
trade volume of US$2.06 billion or 0.44%, in 28th  place). January 2006-January 2007, using data from the Taiwanese 
Bureau of Foreign Trade. 
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Vice-President Isatou Njie-Saidy of The Gambia. The Taipei Declaration affirmed the ‘great 
historical significance’ of this ‘new chapter in the history of Taiwan-Africa diplomatic relations’.19 
Five core areas were singled out as priorities: information and communications technologies, 
economic development; medical assistance, the environment; peace and security. Like FOCAC, the 
summit produced an Action Plan and established a Follow-up Committee for its implementation. 
Shortly afterwards, an assortment of politicians, academics and NGO representatives gathered for 
the 2007 Taiwan-Africa Progressive Partnership Forum. If development was the prominent public 
theme of the Summit, Taiwan’s aspiration to join the UN was its key subtext. Taiwan’s Foreign 
Affairs Minister, James Chih-fang Huang, had toured Taiwan’s five African allies (plus Chad) in 
July 2007 to carry the torch for Taiwan’s annual attempt to join the UN. Beijing-supporting African 
governments have spoken out against the bid. One section of the Summit Declaration got to the 
heart of Taiwan’s diplomatic objectives in Africa. It affirmed that ‘Taiwan’s African allies support 
Taiwan’s legitimate right to join the United Nations and its specialized agencies’. They duly backed 
Taiwan’s attempt to join the UN, but on 21 September 2007 the UN General Assembly’s General 
Committee decided not to place the issue of membership on the UN’s agenda, thus thwarting 
Taipei’s fifteenth consecutive bid.20 
 
Anatomy of current relations 
 
The present phase of China’s Africa engagement continues but departs from its past involvement in 
terms of its scope, scale and importance. Many commentators thought that the PRC’s presence in 
Africa in the 1960s would endure and effect political change, while during the 1990s some went as 
far as to dismiss China’s importance in the continent altogether (see Segal, 1992). However, the 
context of relations has altered in important ways. China’s position in the world has shifted away 
from self-reliance and into an interdependent phase, as signalled and deepened by China’s 
accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 (see Johnson and Ross, 2006). The nature of 
China’s state-backed thrust into Africa appears to be predicated upon a medium-long term 
involvement in which China’s diplomatic presence throughout Africa serves commercial 
objectives.21 Furthermore, while primarily anchored in state-related forms, the growing diversity of 
engagement by a range of Chinese actors ensures that the objectives of state and new private actors 
are no longer necessarily coterminous as they once might have been. 
 
Trade 
 
Trade between Africa and China began to accelerate in 2000 when official two-way China-Africa 
trade stood at US$10.5 billion. This rose to US$29.5 billion in 2004, nearly US$40 billion in 2005, 
US$55.5 billion in 2006 and US$73 billion in 2007.  The November 2006 FOCAC summit set a 
target for trade to reach US$100 billion by 2010. With 2007’s total trade having been reached by 
August 2008, however, this looked set to be broken two years early: total trade for 2008 projected 
at some US$117 billion, a 73% increase on 2006.22 If realised, this will make China the clear 
second largest single trade partner with Africa after the US. China’s share of African exports rose 
from 1.3% in 1995 to 9.3% in 2004, and was accompanied by ‘significant redirection’ and decline 
of African exports to OECD countries between 1995 and 2004 (Goldstein et al, 2006: 45). In the 
context of China’s overall economic relations, however, the continent remains a comparatively 
small trade partner for China in the larger scheme of Chinese trade: Africa accounted for 2.6% of 
the total volume of China’s foreign trade in 2004 (MOFCOM, 2005: 126). Overall trade in 2005 
                                                 
19 First Taiwan-Africa Heads of State Summit Taipei Declaration, Taipei, 9 September 2007. 
20 AP, ‘China thanks Africans for defeating Taiwan’s bid to join UN’, 28 September 2007. 
21 China’s already considerable diplomatic presence in Africa, and its stress on having diplomatic representation in as 
many states as possible, is a contrast to Britain, among others; Britain is scaling back and regionalizing diplomatic 
representation, something the Chinese consider surprising. This reflects the fundamental statist orientation of the 
Chinese engagement with Africa. 
22 ‘Champions of commerce’, Africa-Asia Confidential October 2008, p. 1. 
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bore a deficit for China of some US$2.95 billion which, in practice, meant an operating deficit with 
a small number of resource-producing states (including Angola, Sudan, Republic of Congo, and 
Equatorial Guinea). The profile of China’s imports from Africa reflects the unequally distributed 
geography of Africa’s resources. China has become a major market for key African raw and soft 
commodity producers: Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, Zambia, and the two Congos. Overall, five oil- and 
mineral-exporting countries account for 85% of Africa’s exports to China (Broadman, 2007: 12). 
Oil is the most significant export, making up almost 100% of Angolan exports to China, with 
timber also important.23 Growing African exports to China correlate narrowly with the growth of its 
major commodity exports (oil, metals/ minerals, agricultural products, woods, cotton) to China. A 
leading illustration of the impact of Chinese competition is the case of African textile industry (See 
Morris, 2000). The Multifibre Agreement (MFA) quota systems and investment from Asia 
contributed to the development of the clothing industry in Southern Africa, including Lesotho and 
Swaziland, in the 1990s. When quota limits on Chinese exporters under the MFA were lifted in 
January 2005, the impact of this was considerable for African clothing and textile exporters 
benefiting from the US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Overall African clothing 
exports under AGOA declined by 17% in 2005. Lesotho’s and Madagascar’s exports fell by 14%. 
The main casualty was South Africa, with a 45% decrease in exports. The impact on employment in 
2004-5 was tangible: employment in the clothing sector in Lesotho declined by 28.9%, 6,000 textile 
workers lost jobs in Lesotho in January 2005 alone; in Swaziland employment in this industry fell 
by 56.2%, and in South Africa by 12.2% (Kaplinsky et al, 2006: 18-19). Despite the notable impact 
in these Southern African cases, and their particular characteristics involving mobile Chinese 
businesses, in the broader scheme of factors contributing to de-industrialisation associated with 
trade liberalization from the 1980s, the importance of AGOA should be appropriately 
contextualised and not overplayed. 
 
China-Africa trade relations should be considered in world context and the differential impacts 
within Africa appreciated, as Kaplinsky has underlined (op cit). China has significantly contributed 
to keeping annual world economic growth above the 4% threshold deemed ‘critical for improving 
the terms of trade for primary commodity producers’ (Goldstein et al, 2006: 18-19). China is a key 
world net importer of commodities. Low US interest rates, assisted by Asian countries’ recycling of 
their considerable foreign exchange reserves into US securities, stimulated raw commodity prices 
and benefited commodity exporters in Africa. The expansion of China’s manufactured exports may 
have helped to reduce world prices for manufactured goods, but this translated into pressure on 
major African clothing exporters (Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, South Africa and 
Swaziland), which have been impacted to differential extents (with Mauritius, for example, not 
being as badly affected and itself offering a case-study in Chinese diasporic trade networks 
connected to that country’s manufacturing sector). Africa is benefiting in mixed ways from a 
worldwide growth cycle driven by China and reinforced by India. Real GDP in Africa grew at an 
annual rate of 4.2% between 2001 and 2004 (compared with 3.3% between 1997 and 2000). Sub-
Saharan Africa’s real GDP growth rate reached an eight-year high at 5.4% in 2004, with rising 
commodity prices played a critical role in the increase. Despite its overwhelming importance for 
Africa itself, Chinese FDI in Africa remains a comparatively small proportion of its overall outward 
FDI (some 3-5%) and is itself in practice concentrated (Mauritius, for example, receiving a large 
share).24 However, statistics vary. UNCTAD reported that the level of China’s FDI reached US$1.6 
billion by 2005.25  The Chinese National Bureau of Statistics reported direct investment in Africa as 
                                                 
23 Combined with crude oil, these accounting for 97.1% of Gabon’s and 84 % of Cameroon’s exports to China. 
24 Sudan was the most important recipient of official Chinese FDI in Africa until the end of 2005. It ranked as the 9th 
largest recipient (US$352 million) of China’s total outward FDI by 2005.  In 2004 it ranked 4th as a destination of 
China’s overseas FDI with US$146.7 million, which represented a 46% share of China’s FDI to Africa. Sudan took 
22% of accumulated net Chinese FDI to Africa by the end of 2005 (though it dropped to 8th with $91.13 million - 
around 0.6% of China’s FDI total - in 2005 itself). China Statistical Yearbook 2006, p. 759 
25 See UNCTAD, Asian Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Towards a New Era of Cooperation among Developing 
Countries (New York and Geneva: UNCTAD, 2007). 
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US$392 million in 2005 but other statistics show significantly higher levels; Chinese FDI is 
estimated at over US$900 million in 2004 out of a total FDI in Africa of US15 billion. One report, 
noting that China’s direct investment in Africa for the years 2000-2006 was US$6.6 billion 
according to China’s Ministry of Commerce, suggests that ‘official statistics may not fully capture 
the true magnitude of direct investment by Chinese entities in African countries.’ (Wang, 2007)  
 
Not all investment is supported directly by the Chinese central government: there is an emerging 
dynamic of regional investment directed from lower levels of Chinese government, including the 
provincial level,26 as well as private entrepreneurial investment. The dominance of major resource 
providers in China’s imports from Africa is reflected in Chinese investment patterns concentrated 
on resource-producing states. Chinese FDI to Africa appears predominantly resource oriented. In 
2004 China became the world’s second largest importer of oil after the US, and it sources some 
30% of oil imports from Africa. Angola is China’s biggest supplier of oil in Africa, currently 
providing some 500,000 barrels per day, or 15%, of China’s imports. Chinese national oil 
companies are pivotal drivers of overseas oil investment. Natural resource rich countries continue to 
be main destinations, with 50-80% of Chinese FDI in Africa in natural-resource exploitation and 
resource rich countries (Angola, Sudan, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, South Africa). However, 
concurrent with this concentration of investment and commercial activity in larger, resource rich 
economies, there are processes seeing Chinese business ‘rolling out across the continent relatively 
evenly, positioning themselves in countries such as Sierra Leone with comparatively virginal 
markets and less rigid government control that presumably permit them to realize higher profits.’ 
(CCS, 2006: 40) Investment relations have gained momentum and increasingly are subject to 
bilateral regulation. As well as state diplomacy, Chinese Trade Centres assist Chinese investment 
by providing information to both local and Chinese businesses considering investing or trading, and 
a degree of logistical support with business start-ups. Chinese Economic and Commercial 
Counsellors attached to Chinese embassies also provide information. Investment is thus set to 
increase exponentially. China’s African Development Fund, announced during the third FOCAC, 
was launched in June 2007 with US$1 billion of a projected US$5 billion fund to encourage and 
support Chinese business operating in Africa. The project is ambitious and aims to ‘self-
development’: ‘to achieve an increase in employment, to reduce imports, to increase exports, and to 
improve the international payments imbalances of some countries.’27 In this scheme, the China 
Development Bank will in practice oversee government equity support for Chinese corporations for 
commercial activities in Africa as a major part of China’s ‘economic cooperation’. Progress of the 
CDF, as of late 2008, however has been mixed, and characterised by slow disbursement in part due 
to lack of capacity by the Fund’s administrators to process applications. It has already invested over 
US$900 million on a range of projects, including a glass factory in Ethiopia (valued at US$15 
million) or the Shenzhen Energy Group’s US$500 million cycle plant investment in Ghana. 
 
The established pattern of trade—China mostly importing African natural resources and exporting 
manufactured goods in return— shows little sign of being changed to any significant extent. While 
African business is stepping up operations in China, if from a very low starting point, continuing 
concern that China is replicating more established patterns of Africa’s unfavourable relations with 
external partners has continued to be articulated and is recognized as a challenge by the Chinese 
government. The basic question facing Africa’s trade with China (as indeed with the EU, for 
example) is what can be exported to China beyond resources? While Beijing seeks credit for 
expanding its zero-tariff policy, in practice this is of largely symbolic value. In 2004, African 
exports corresponded to just 72 of 190 zero tariffs lines (Broadman, 2007: 170). Nor do these 
                                                 
26 In certain cases, these revive older connections. For instance Hefei, the capital of Anhui Province in eastern China, 
became a sister-city of Freetown in 1984, and the Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Corporation was operating in 
Sierra Leone in 2006. 
27 Africa Investment Club, “Mr. Chi Jianxin, CEO of China-Africa development fund analyses Fund Policy”, Africa 
Investment (Beijing: Africa Investment Club, 2008), p. 47. 
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translate to a significant amount: in 2006 China imported some US$350 million of goods under the 
zero-tariff policy, including US$180 million worth of sesame.28 
 
Chinese companies have become the most confident investors in Africa (See Alden and Davies, 
2006). This is especially the case in South Africa, but other important destinations include 
Tanzania, Ghana and Senegal. The diversity of Chinese companies is considerable, ranging from 
major multi-billion dollar SOEs to small and medium sized enterprises or businesses run by 
individuals. The majority of Chinese companies in the initial phase of market entry have been SOEs 
but there are an increasing number of private Chinese companies. The major state-backed Chinese 
investors do not appear to have substantially integrated into African business communities yet, in 
contrast to entrepreneurial networks such as those in Mauritius with more embedded positions built 
up over time. China opened its first Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone in Zambia in February 
2007. With it, and the others that were down to follow (up to five were pledged in November 2006; 
this figure may be increased), the successful model employed in China is being transplanted into 
Africa. 
 
A substantial amount of commercially oriented Chinese financial activity has been devoted to 
infrastructure projects.29 Chinese companies have in a relatively short time attained a strong 
position, in part through a reputation for low costs and fast delivery and, with the notable exception 
of South African business, lack of competition (though competition between Chinese companies – 
or Chinese-on-Chinese competition - is a factor). Frequently financed by soft loans, state-linked 
Chinese companies run successful infrastructure construction projects across Africa. China’s Roads 
and Bridges Corporation, for example, is active in various contexts such as Angola where it is 
rehabilitating 1,200 km of roads between Luanda and Uige. Chinese actors are also involved in dam 
projects.30 Chinese FDI in services, particularly telecommunications, is also increasing across 
Africa. Huawei Technologies has expanded communications business to 39 Sub-Saharan African 
countries. Tourism is another area of expanding cooperation; 26 African countries are now 
officially approved destinations for Chinese tourists.31 An important dynamic facilitating 
investment is the role of state-backed Chinese banks. The Export-Import Bank of China (or Exim) 
has rapidly become the world’s largest export credit agency with ‘significant and expanding 
operations in Africa’ (Moss and Rose, 2006). Exim Bank operates in a manner that differs from the 
export credit rules prevailing in OECD economies. As a state-backed bank, it has been funding 
projects often linked to broader political aims.32 A number of new African borrower countries with 
Exim Bank, such as Ghana (with a projected US$1.2 billion worth of new loans including an 
upgrade of the Bui dam), were granted debt relief under the HIPC initiative. Chinese companies, 
however, draw on a range of funding, not just that directly connected to the Chinese government. 
Exim Bank and other Chinese banks have emerged as bilateral competitors for the established IFIs, 
though they also represent potential in the way of collaboration. This dynamic at first provoked 
concerned reactions in a phase of adjustment to rising Chinese financial strength; the President of 
the European Investment Bank, for example, noting strong competition from Chinese banks in 
Africa, commented that ‘they do not bother with social and human rights conditions’, adding that 
                                                 
28 ‘MOC official answers questions on granting zero-tariff to least-developed African countries’, 20 August 2007 from 
the MOFCOM website. 
29 There is often a thickening of ties on the back of investments or new projects. For example, the China Southern 
Airlines air link between Nigeria and Beijing through Dubai will facilitate travelling by some 100,000 Chinese workers 
and engineers who are in Nigeria for railway construction. 
30 Such as Ethiopia’s hydroelectric dam and power plant on the Tekeze River, Sudan’s controversial Meroe (Hamdab) 
dam, the Mphanda Nkuwa Dam in Mozambique, the Gangelas Dam in Angola, the Adjarala Dam between Togo and 
Benin, and the Imboulou Dam in Congo Brazzaville. 
31 With the addition of Algeria, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Gabon, Rwanda, Mali, Mozambique, Benin and Nigeria. 
Action plan of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation. 5 November 2006. 
32 The former Nigerian President Obasanjo called for the establishment of an 'Africa-China Bank', a new regional 
institution, to promote investments between China and African countries. ‘Nigeria Proposes Africa-ChinaBank’, 
Nigeria First (Abuja), 7 November 2006. 
 10
‘We should continue to have conditionality, but we need to think about it.’33 The announcement by 
the President of the African Development Bank, Donald Kaberuka, at its May 2007 meeting held in 
Shanghai, that Exim Bank had agreed to finance projects worth US$20 billion over the next three 
years, would mean that it will be the single biggest financing agency over that period.34 Clearly, 
while at first provoking concern, the trend has been toward collaboration, seen notably when the 
World Bank agreed to collaborate with China in Africa in December 2007 and from which a 
number of projects have been mooted. 
 
Aid and Development 
 
The history of Chinese foreign aid in Africa is such as to arguably render China a ‘re-emerging’ 
actor, or, given the rather different circumstances of China’s current role, as an emerging aid actor 
in new conditions. The salient characteristic of Chinese aid is clearly that it is not as explicitly 
intrusive or prescriptive as Western practice. This is particularly the case when it comes to the 
absence of explicit and public political conditionality - ‘no [political] strings attached’ - with the 
important and sole exception of the One China principle but the prevailing, indeed normative, 
absence of prescriptive engagement on governance clearly contrasts with prevailing Western 
approaches. When it comes to economic policy and relations, however, the indications are, as might 
be expected, that strings are attached as a normal part of trade or bilateral business engagement. An 
important distinguishing feature of Chinese aid and development assistance is offered on the basis 
of stated ‘equality and mutual benefit’ in a spirit of partnership geared toward common benefit. 
This contrast with standard Western donor practice marks a basic and fundamental difference in 
approach that remains politically consequential. ‘The Chinese do not see themselves primarily as 
“donors,” preferring the language of “cooperation” and “partnership.” (Brautigam, 2007) If China’s 
official rhetoric is compared to that of partnership recently developed by OECD-DAC donors and 
expressed in the Paris Declaration of 2005, for example, then China’s discourse is not as different 
as it might seem at the official level. However, what is striking about China’s discourse of 
development partnership is that is has proved to be notably resilient in being constant over time as 
opposed to the chameleon pattern of shifting Western development discourse. Furthermore, it 
begins from a different standing point in upholding political equality as the basis of relations rather 
than a hierarchical relation of recent development relations. China has thus far not issued a white 
paper on its overseas aid or the principles governing it today. Historical precedents thus continue to 
guide and inform the official discourse on aid, embedded within the general principles governing 
China’s foreign policy (including, most importantly, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 
from 1954 and the Eight Principles on Foreign Aid announced by Zhou Enlai in 1964).  
 
Traditional altruistic aid is no longer at the forefront of China’s African engagement, though the 
effects of Chinese aid to Africa remain visible in terms of high-profile infrastructure. Officially the 
Chinese government focuses on agricultural development, infrastructure, human resources training, 
and medical and health cooperation. Details of the quantity, concentration and terms and conditions 
of zero-interest or concessional loans, grants, technical assistance are however elusive, but such 
forms of aid appear to be bound up with infrastructure projects.35 China’s aid programme is 
estimated to be in the region of US$500-800 million per year with a target of some US$1 billion for 
2009 (see Oya, 2008). China provides most of its aid in Africa through two main instruments: 
‘complete plant projects (turn-key projects that involve construction or repair of buildings, 
infrastructure, or facilities of some kind) and technical cooperation projects that involve training 
and assistance.’ (Brautigam op cit) Chinese aid has been a source of controversy fuelled by and 
within a reactive Western media to a meaningful extent but has also been articulated by a growing 
                                                 
 33 ‘Chinese loans to Africa dangerous’ – EU Bank’, AFP, 29 November 2006. 
34 Africa Confidential, ‘Year of the Pig – the New Scramble for Africa’, 48, 11 (2007), pp. 6-7. 
35 China’s pledge to double its 2006 assistance to Africa by 2009, for example, was hard to gauge in the absence of 
adequate baseline data about current levels of assistance.  
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number of African trade unions and civil society activists. Some is rapidly disbursed according to 
political opportunity; in other cases it is bound to China’s larger investments in resources. Aid is 
used in symbolic gestures assisting economic involvement. ‘Prestige’ projects are often linked to 
improving relations with states (constructing stadiums in Mali and Djibouti, or the houses of 
parliament in Mozambique and Gabon). Some of these such projects are politically important 
though not of a nature that would be readily financed by ‘traditional’ donors, a dynamic underlining 
the fact that China has been willing and able to fill notable gaps left by the more established donors 
in Africa. The first of 10 anti-malaria centres due to be built in 2007—and a total of 30 pledged by 
2009—opened in Liberia in February as part of a broader health sector training and cooperation 
programme. FOCAC 3 also pledged to expand Chinese support for scholarships for African 
students studying in China, education and agricultural aid, including Chinese technical assistance.36 
Aid is one area in which China looks set to expand not merely to enhance its interests but also to 
further claims to leadership and demonstrate constructive contribution to human development 
beyond narrowly extractive or profit-oriented activities. In recent years China has supported 
humanitarian aid, conflict resolution and peacekeeping in Africa as part of an apparent emerging 
and increasingly prominent role as humanitarian donor and development force.37 Chinese 
humanitarian assistance is standardly provided in kind. Aid can also finance vehicles (such as patrol 
boats provided to Sierra Leone and to Mauritius), equipment or material goods in general, and even 
on uncommon occasions direct budgetary support. 
 
Debt relief has been a prominent area of Chinese aid and political relations. China has committed 
itself to cancelling some US$1.27 billion worth of debt from 31 African countries. Promises of 
further debt relief were made at the third FOCAC, followed by a number of other gestures early in 
2007.38 Media and culture are additional sectors of expanding cooperation. There are currently 
Confucius Institutes in Rwanda (at the Kigali Institute of Education), Zimbabwe, Madagascar and 
Egypt, two in Kenya and South Africa and three in Nigeria. China’s new small volunteer 
programme started in 2006 with a government pledge to send 300 ‘youth volunteers’ to Africa.39 
 
China’s positive impact on development in Africa has come to assume a more prominent position. 
While continuing to address poverty in China, China has also long expressed its commitment to 
poverty reduction in Africa.40 Recent moves in this area include the establishment of the 
International Poverty Reduction Center in Beijing in 2005 by China’s State Council’s Leading 
Group Office for Poverty Alleviation and Development, the Ministry of Commerce and UNDP.41 It 
hosted an international conference with experts from Africa, Asia and Latin America in May 2006. 
                                                 
36 The most recent FOCAC pledged that China would: ‘Over the next three years, train 15,000 African professionals; 
send 100 senior agricultural experts to Africa; set up 10 special agricultural technology demonstration centers in Africa; 
build 100 rural schools in Africa; and increase the number of Chinese 
government scholarships to African students from the current 2,000 per year to 4,000 per year by 2009.’ Around 1,100 
students from 46 African countries were studying in China in 2006. An Egyptian-Chinese University was planned for 
Egypt 
37 The total number of Chinese military personnel and civilian police sent on peacekeeping missions in stood at over 
1,800 in early 2007, with pledges of continent participation in peacekeeping missions and assistance to ‘African 
regional organizations’. Some three quarters were supporting UN operations 
in Africa, mainly Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan. In November 2006, the World Food Programme 
welcomed China’s first donation of US $1.75 million since it graduated from being a recipient of food aid at the end of 
2005. 
38 Chad receiving US$32 million in debt relief, Equatorial Guinea US$75 million and Sudan some $80 million. 
39 In November 2006, 10 of a projected 50 Chinese professional volunteers were working the Ethiopian News Agency, 
Ethiopian Television, Press Agency and various sections under the Ministry of Information ‘Chinese Volunteers Begin 
Free Service’, The Ethiopian Herald (Addis Ababa), 10 November 2006. 
40 One recent example of experience sharing was a conference in ‘Supporting Africa's Development: Sharing 
Experience to Reduce Poverty’ in September 2004 held in Beijing.Xinhua, 24 September 2004. 
41 It ‘aims to facilitate the sharing of knowledge between China and other developing and transition economies as well 
as international development institutions on poverty reduction policies and strategies experience.’ UNDP, ‘UNDP and 
Government to Set Up International Poverty Reduction Centre in China’, 27 May 2005. 
 12
Liu Jian, director of China's State Council Leading Group Office of Poverty Alleviation and 
Development, commented: ‘We will contribute our experience to advancing global efforts on 
poverty reduction, and will draw on the expertise and methodologies from other countries to 
promote China's domestic agenda.’42  
 
There is no intentionally rival ‘Beijing Consensus’; indeed, Beijing has attempted to manage fears 
about China’s expanding power in the world, especially with regard to Washington.43 In its 
presentation of a ‘different’ approach to development attractive to many African governments, 
however, Beijing clearly wishes to emphasise that it represents a positive alternative. China 
advances claims to legitimate development activity in Africa through a combination of common 
positions and differences - a ‘development in Africa approach with Chinese characteristics’. Like 
many governments, China may question the categories of democracy or human rights but has 
adopted these terms for its own purposes. While not rejecting these outright, it has its own 
interpretations.44  The 2006 Africa Strategy cites the importance of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), which China has not just adhered to but been a strong international supporter of.  
While development is becoming more central to China’s justification of its engagement with Africa, 
China also likes to remind Western actors of their primary development obligations in Africa. The 
FOCAC declaration in November 2006, for example, called on ‘the international community’ to 
increase development assistance, open markets, act on debt relief and ‘help Africa realize the UN 
Millennium Development Goals.’45 One area of policy and politics set to remain important is very 
much the issue of the ways, means and extent to which aspects of China’s own developmental 
experience could be transferred productively over the long-term as regards the complex challenges 
of development in the African continent. 
 
The current moment features pressure on China to reform the principles and conduct of its aid and 
other economic investments in Africa, as well as new cooperation between China, the World Bank 
and other donors such as Britain’s Department for International Development. This flags up the 
transition phase China is undergoing in Africa and elsewhere in terms of its aid programmes and its 
dilemmas of negotiating attempts to socialise it into the prevailing OECD norms of aid and 
development. China signed the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness and recently affirmed a desire 
to ‘continue to promote the effectiveness of principles contained in the Paris Declaration.’46  Its 
signature was that of a recipient, rather than a donor with the result that it has not actively 
championed these principles in its own aid policies; when compared with other OECD donors, few 
of which faithfully apply in spirit and letter Paris Declaration commitments in aid practices beyond 
rhetorical adherence, however, China’s position vis-à-vis this standard is less exceptional than 
knee-jerk reactions by critics have projected. Signing without substantive participation would be 
consistent with China’s behaviour in other multilateral arenas. Certain Paris Declaration provisions, 
including untied aid, run counter to Chinese practice. Others, including donor ‘harmonization’ and 
‘complementarity’, clash with China’s unwillingness to dilute its distinctiveness by accommodating 
itself in multilateral development frameworks. China would not be able to strike deals as quickly or 
effectively if it adopted lengthy rigorous procedures of impact assessment beyond economic 
viability and political usefulness 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 Press Release, ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy in the New Millennium: Emerging Issues, Experiences and Lessons 
Experts Convene International Conference on Poverty Reduction’, 19 May 2006.  
43 As seen in debates about how to characterize its growth as a ‘peaceful rise’ or ‘peaceful development’. 
44 China has signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1998), the International Covenant on 
Economic and Social Rights (2001), ratified the Convention against Torture, CEDAW and the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. 
45 Declaration of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, 5 November 2006. 
46 Joint Statement of the Ninth EU-China Summit, Helsinki 9 September 2006, 9 September 2006.  
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China Africa’s relations in international politics 
 
Looking at the broader canvas of international politics, China’s developing relations with Africa 
have implications on a number of fronts. In the first instance, China’s growing political clout in 
Africa is based on its surging economic presence across the continent, something that derives from 
the profound transformation of the Chinese domestic economic environment since 1978 (See, 
amongst others, Kitissou ed., 2007; Sautman and Yan, 2007). This enormously powerful economy 
in turn poses opportunities and challenges for Africa’s own development prospects as well as the 
continent’s economic ties and political orientation towards its traditional partners in the West. And, 
finally, the emergence of China as a leading actor in Africa is compelling precisely because it is the 
most prominent expression of emerging international trends that put China at the centre of 
contemporary global politics. 
 
For China itself, as the renewed engagement with Africa flows directly from the three decades of 
rapid development, the relationship holds implications for the course and conduct of China’s 
transformation from socialist bastion to a fully market capitalist economy. At the sharp end of 
China’s presence in Africa are its state-owned enterprises involved in resource extraction and 
infrastructure development. They are products of the CCP’s decision to transform moribund state 
institutions into state-directed multinational firms able to compete against the best of the established 
international corporations. This ‘going out’ policy, formally launched in 2001, is supported by 
Beijing’s astute ‘no conditions’ diplomacy as well as billions of dollars in foreign reserves, which 
have allowed companies like PetroChina, ZTC or Jiangsu International to gain a foothold in 
markets in a short period. As they establish their presence in Africa, their practices—derived from 
experience at home, where social and environmental legislation has been weak to non-existent—
increasingly determine the shape of relations with Africa. Complicating matters is the 
decentralization of economic policies, which has reduced the central government’s ability to 
influence the actions of private Chinese entrepreneurs (Gill and Reilly, 2007). With African 
resources becoming ever more important to the health of the Chinese economy, Beijing’s domestic 
policy of delivering greater prosperity at home, on the back of sometimes painful economic 
reforms, without relinquishing significant political control is arguably in danger of becoming 
hostage to the fortunes of its international forays in places like Africa. Surely this is what is being 
seen in the diplomatic controversy over Chinese support for the pariah regime in Sudan. While 
China-Africa relations are an important factor in Beijing’s own domestic calculations, the 
burgeoning ties with China hold tremendous implications for Africa. Africa’s development needs, 
as outlined in a host of initiatives such as the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), 
require an infusion of substantial foreign investment aimed at improving its physical infrastructure, 
the opening of new markets and better prices for its products, and an expansion of human capital, 
all of which would contribute to a sustained growth cycle that would allow the continent to meet its 
development aims for the next decade. China’s engagement with Africa provides for many of these 
very conditions and that is why, irrespective of the concerns being voiced in some circles in Africa 
(see below), Chinese involvement is widely considered to be a positive-sum game (see, for 
example, le Pere and Shelton, 2007). For instance, diversifying sources of foreign investment, an 
explicit policy pursued by the oil producers like Angola and Nigeria, has contributed to 
opportunities to extract better terms from donors and lenders alike. At the same time, it should be 
noted that China’s rapid insertion into Africa has benefited directly from the previous decades of 
neo-liberal restructuring of African economies, including the removal of barriers to investment and 
the privatization of state-owned assets. Moreover, their investment outreach commenced at roughly 
the same time as the West began to reduce its exposure to Africa (as illustrated, most notoriously, 
by the French-directed devaluation of the CFA Franc in 1994 and the Western shift to pursuing 
investment opportunities in, ironically, China) (See, for example, Manji and Marks, 2007). In this 
context, China’s rapid gains on the continent, far from being a sudden ‘scramble for Africa’, could 
be more accurately described as pushing on an open door, one which in any case the West had left 
ajar as it scrambled eastward. 
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The Chinese impact on governance in Africa, which has exercised Western and African minds 
alike, is arguably the most contentious component of its engagement. By actively courting ‘pariah 
regimes’ like those of Sudan and Zimbabwe, Beijing has not only irritated the West—which at least 
initially was not seen to be a particularly worrisome outcome by Chinese officialdom—but found 
itself at odds with an emerging consensus on the necessity of good governance within Africa itself. 
The voices arguing for improvements in accountability, transparency and democracy were not just 
civil society activists but some of the top leaders of the continent, like Nigeria’s former President 
Olusegun Obasanjo and South Africa’s former President Thabo Mbeki, and their concerns were 
reflected in the reformulation of the African Union and the NEPAD initiative. This unexpected 
development put China in an invidious position, opening it to criticism from African sources of its 
single-minded pursuit of profit over the needs and concerns of ordinary Africans. The paradoxical 
result of this has been seen in the case of Sudan, with a seemingly gradual shift away from its 
categorical support for non-intervention in domestic affairs to one in which it supports the African 
Union position (and with that the West) on the necessity of a peacekeeping operation in Darfur.47  
 
The fast pace and changing dynamics of Chinese foreign policy towards the continent is a 
noteworthy feature of its engagement. China’s Africa policy changed in three discernable ways 
after the Beijing Summit of 2006. It moved beyond its primary focus on resource acquisition into 
areas like financial services and an expansion of activity related to agriculture. It attempted to build 
islands of Chinese investment in the form of Economic Cooperation Zones in selected African 
countries; and it modified its conventional investment packages to include greater emphasis on 
social and community outreach. The bold foray into financial services—with the US$5.4 billion 
purchase of 20% of South Africa’s Standard Bank (its largest bank and the one with the most 
exposure in Africa) in November 2007 by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and, less 
than a week later, the announcement of a partnership between the China Development Bank and 
Nigeria’s United Bank of Africa—signalled the deepening of its economic engagement. Building 
on its past history as a provider of technical assistance in this sector, Chinese sponsored agricultural 
centres are springing up across Africa and, when combined with an expanding Chinese role in 
financing, training and commercial farming, seem to presage a more substantive involvement.48 
Debates around the uncertain status of the structure of the Economic Cooperation Zones, stalled 
their development in other regions. The now conventional approach of Chinese FDI in resource rich 
countries was adjusted, as seen in the over US$5 billion package for the DRC announced in 
September 2007 which included US$3 billion for infrastructure rehabilitation and US$2 billion to 
develop mines in Katanga, Ituri and the Kivus, while 31 hospitals and two universities are to be 
built. A new ‘social clause’ has come into Chinese investment in Africa.  
 
Finally, China’s deepening presence in Africa holds wider implications for the international system. 
It has challenged Western pre-eminence in a region that had long served as Europe’s ‘chasse 
gardée’ and, for the United States, as an increasingly important source of its energy needs. 
Moreover, China’s ability to command colossal financial resources, from revenues arising from its 
arrival as the premier global manufacturer and a leading trading nation, in the service of its foreign 
policy interests gives it an easy position that Western states can only envy. Just as America’s shift 
from debtor to creditor nation after 1919 is marked by historians as a turning point in the 
distribution of power in the international system, so too China’s status as a top international creditor 
is a signal that power is moving East. The shock induced by Africa’s dwindling interest in 
borrowing from the World Bank and European Investment Bank, which initially caused both 
institutions to decry Chinese lending practices as well as questioning their own relevance, is 
                                                 
 47 See ‘Arms, Oil, and Darfur: The Evolution of Relations between China and Sudan’, Sudan Issue Brief (Geneva: 
Small Arms Survey, 2007). 
48 ‘Chinese team to discuss agricultural centre’, Agência de Informação de Moçambique, 7 November 2007. 
Discussions are being held in Senegal and South Africa, while Chinese farmers are establishing themselves in Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. 
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seemingly another indicator of the West’s putative marginalization on the continent.49 It follows 
that the likes of the World Bank or the European Commission seek to develop partnerships with 
China on aspects of their respective African engagement, the latter through an as yet awkward 
attempt at trilateral cooperation process which has yet to proceed far. China’s capturing of markets 
through the unbeatable combination of aggressive diplomacy, financial largesse and low costs, 
coupled with African aptitude in playing one suitor off of the other, only fuels this sense of 
impending relegation in Western capitals. Faced with this new challenge to their established 
international standing, the leading industrial countries sought to respond through a strategy of 
heightened public criticism and grudging collusion with China. China in turn, belatedly recognizing 
the dangers posed by an aroused Western perception of threat to established interests, sought to 
counter this discourse of fear with its own declaration that China’s rise to prominence would be 
peaceful. In this context, Robert Zoellick, the former US Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and 
currently President of the World Bank, has called on China to assume a role as ‘responsible 
stakeholder’ in the international system commensurate with its economic importance. Africa, again, 
is held to be a litmus test for Beijing’s commitment to a largely Western-inspired agenda on 
governance and accountability. 
 
Conclusion: Between Chinese ‘exceptionalism’ and Western convergence in Africa 
 
The consolidation of China’s newly attained position in Africa presents challenges that are at once 
the ordinary stuff of preserving these interests but also, and more profoundly, negotiating and 
reassessing its position within the international system. The Chinese government’s distinctive mode 
of conducting its relations with the continent, which might be broadly labeled Chinese 
‘exceptionalism’, is founded in an historically-informed framework and reinforced by official 
contemporary rhetoric emphasising equality, mutual benefit, sovereignty and non-interference. It is 
given expression and codified in the language, framing and actual conduct of official state relations 
and is informed by a discourse of difference and similitude: China as a power that is categorically 
different than all previous external powers engaged in Africa and that this difference is based 
fundamentally on its seminal experience as a developing country. As such Chinese exceptionalism 
is a modality of engagement that will ensure ‘mutual benefit’ and ‘win-win’ outcomes at 
continental and bilateral levels: it will structure relations such that they may remain asymmetrical in 
economic content but equal in terms of recognition of economic gains and political standing 
(mutual respect and political equality). Chinese diplomacy has operated on a different basis from 
the more overtly hierarchical power relations of established external powers. It has been mostly 
successful to date, even to the point where external reactions have problematically suggested that 
China is somehow immune to the prevailing forces of political and economic gravity in Africa.   
 
There is a striking diversity of emerging Chinese activities and interests ranging from Southern 
Africa to former Lusophone Africa, east Africa or the Horn, and across strategically important cases 
like South Africa, Angola or Sudan to less prominent but nonetheless revealing cases such as 
Tanzania, Namibia or Cape Verde. Investment protection amidst burgeoning economic activities 
has become more important to the Chinese government and companies. In places the expansion and 
consolidation of Chinese interests appears to entail a logic of deepening political involvement. 
China’s approach has been more than sufficient to confer legitimacy and enable flourishing 
relations with many African states. However, this has been subject to increasing strain by the 
growing complexity of ties. One consequence of China’s sheer visibility and the fanfare 
accompanying its ascendancy in Africa is that Beijing faces the challenge of managing the high 
expectations it has generated and continuing to deliver in Africa, while continuing to achieve 
development in China. In responding to grievances concerning business practices, environmental 
impact, increased security threats and demands for protection by Chinese nationals in Africa, the 
                                                 
49 ‘China treads on Western toes in Africa’, Financial Times, 12 January 2007. 
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central Chinese government is attempting to direct a diverse array of Chinese actors, over which its 
ability to exercise control appears to be not as great as widely assumed (Gill and Reilly, 2007).  
 
Current relations amount to an emergent phase marked by an evolving set of issues. Greater 
involvement has already brought unanticipated challenges as different Chinese interests have been 
exposed to the vagaries of politics in different parts of Africa. Chinese actors are becoming more 
established in Africa through experience and the progressive deepening of links. This process 
whereby a range of Chinese interests become a more normal part of Africa’s socio-economic and 
political life is one likely to erode the popular reputation for exceptionalism China has enjoyed 
from below. Nonetheless, with China’s newly prominent role in Africa rejuvenating debate about 
development against a backdrop of future geopolitical uncertainty, the importance of maximizing 
African benefits beyond elites remains a pertinent concern. At the same time as bringing positive 
dimensions and holding undoubted potential, China’s re-engagement also renews enduring 
questions of power, the constraints on development and Africa’s unfavourable, structurally 
subordinated position in the world economy.   
 
The claim that China’s ties with Africa are distinct and substantively different from those of the 
West is thus more significant than it first appears because it connects with the core of China’s 
identity and nature of its relations with the continent. China today presents mixed images to Africa: 
it remains a developing country that has also achieved impressive development, and one whose 
very success is transforming its economy through reform and opening has entailed a process 
whereby its relations with the rest of the world trajectories China’s uncertain status. Today many 
African states consider linking their economic and political direction to a Chinese future precisely 
because of its demonstrable accomplishments and the presumed economic path that it is proceeding 
along. However, the Chinese government’s insistence on its exceptional condition – that it will 
remain a benevolent partner for Africa in a ‘win-win’ strategic partnership despite the unavoidable 
hard facts about the nature of its deepening commodity-based trading relationship – places a 
significant burden on China’s foreign policy to ensure that it is conducted in a manner that retains 
this moral high ground against the backdrop of its evolving commercial and other attendant 
interests on the continent.  Will Beijing be drawn to replicate Western practices, perhaps under the 
impact of disciplinary constraints (See Clapham, 2008), or will it endeavour to retain its ‘friendship 
between most unequal equals’50 with African states irrespective of the cost?  In this, how far will 
Western efforts aimed at socializing China as a ‘responsible’ power in Africa proceed and in what 
ways will China influence currently prevailing standards? More than any other process, the 
incremental revision or even the abandonment of exceptionalism will signal the desire to converge 
with other foreign actors in Africa and, concurrently, the end of the last vestige of Mao’s 
ideological project. 
 
This paper has addressed the changing engagement of that constellation of actors grouped under the 
general heading ‘China’ in the very diverse continent of Africa. However, it should also be 
recognised that the expanding Chinese presence and role in the continent is at the forefront of a 
broader Asian involvement that has implications for Africa’s politics and established relations with 
external powers. Focus on China in Africa has tended to upstage the involvement of other notable 
actors, namely India, which held its own Africa summit in New Delhi in April 2008, and Japan, 
whose fourth meeting of the Tokyo International Conference on Trade and Development was held 
in Yokoyama in May 2008, together with the continuing engagement of the more ‘traditional’ 
external powers under more competitive political and economic circumstances. Nonetheless, China 
remains by far the most important rising force in Africa and it’s return to a position of significance 
in African affairs looks set to have a sustained impact on the continent. If FOCAC III was an 
opportunity to celebrate the achievements in Chinese-African relations, and chart the way forward, 
                                                 
50 As Nyerere once described China-Tanzania relations. Quoted in George T. Yu, China and Tanzania: A Study in 
Cooperative Interaction (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, 1970), p. 97.  
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then FOCAC IV, scheduled for Egypt in November 2009, promises to be a contrast to festivities on 
offer in Beijing in November 2006. The emphasis is to be on fulfilling aims set out at the Beijing 
summit in 2006, a position which suggests that the emerging contours of relations that are 
becoming normalised. Whether the Chinese engagement redefines many of the traditional 
shibboleths of African international relations, as the rhetoric of ‘win-win’ partnerships suggests, 
remains to be seen. In any case, as the proving ground for a new activist China, Africa provides an 
important insight into the conduct of a resurgent China in regions and markets such as Central Asia, 
Latin America and the Middle East. The 21st century is indeed being made in Africa. 
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